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Due to its location at the boundary of the Pacific and Australian tectonic plates, New Zealand 
is regularly jolted by earthquakes.  The strongest since scientific records began was in the 
Wairarapa region in 1855, and is estimated to have been of a magnitude between 8.1 and 8.3 
on the Richter (MW) scale.  Every one to three years there is a quake of magnitude greater 
than 7, but generally these have caused little in the way of damage to society or loss of life,* 
due largely to the happenstance of epicentre locations and (more recently) informed and 
conscientiously implemented design and construction standards. 
New Zealanders live with prospect of “The Big One,” a once-every-few-hundred-years MW > 
8 rupture of the major fault line that is associated with the plate boundary and which runs 
along the western edge of South Island and through the southern part of the North Island.  
The closest approach of this fault to Christchurch is about 130 km, so Christchurch is not 
regarded as being particular earthquake prone.  Indeed, GNS data confirm that its locale is 
seismically rather quiescent in comparison with other parts of the New Zealand.   
When the population of Christchurch and surrounding districts was awoken by violent 
shaking at 4.35 am on the morning of Saturday 4 September, thoughts naturally turned to The 
Big One and, “if it’s this bad here, it must be devastating at the epicentre.”  We soon learnt 
that it was “only” a magnitude-7.1 event.  But it was shallow (focal depth 10 km) and close, 
involving a previously undetected fault with an epicentre just 40 km to the west of the city.  
Remarkably, and perhaps uniquely for such a strong shock in a moderately populated area, 
there were no deaths and only a couple of major injuries – again a testament to a combination 
of good luck (regarding the time of the quake) and excellent building standards. 
Since that day, there have been a vast number of aftershocks, many of them of a magnitude 5 
or greater.  Throughout this period, the city has largely managed to function very adequately, 
despite the focus of the news media on toppled older buildings and the liquefaction of land 
near estuaries and rivers.  This is absolutely not to disparage the trauma that many residents 
have suffered through loss of homes and occupations, but we can be genuinely thankful that 
our situation is vastly better than those resulting from events of similar magnitude in other 
parts of the world. 
After the initial quake, and having established that my family and neighbours were “shaken” 
but unhurt, my thoughts turned to the University of Canterbury and my workplace in the 
                                                            
* The only real exception was the 1931 magnitude-7.8 Napier earthquake, which caused 256 deaths and 
thousands of injuries. 
Department of Chemistry.  Although it didn’t occur to me till later, this is certainly the  first 
time that a New Zealand university has been subjected to anywhere near the shaking that 
Canterbury and Lincoln universities experienced that morning.  In retrospect we have learnt 
many lessons, and it is the objective of this article to share some of those lessons with a wider 
community. 
With electricity and water off, and electronic security systems defeated, the University of 
Canterbury campus was almost immediately closed down and the emergency management 
plan was activated.  The university’s Emergency Response Team was on site and functioning 
within 90 minutes of the event and, as qualified staff arrived on campus, an initial assessment 
of the situation was undertaken and response priorities were identified.  By early the next 
day, engineers had verified the structural soundness of chemistry building and the Head of 
Department, Professor Alison Downard, accompanied by Associate Professor Emily Parker, 
Professor Peter Harland and two members of the University Facilities Management Unit, 
inspected the department.  Their assessment was that there were no particular chemical, 
biological, fire, explosion or flooding hazards; and their recommendation to the Emergency 
Response Team was that the department should implement its recovery process.  The first 
step in that process was to ensure that critical equipment (mostly refrigerators and freezers) 
was connected and switched on to protect valuable samples and minimise hazards when the 
power was returned to the building.  All non-critical equipment was disconnected until 
electrical testing could be conducted.
On the Monday, senior technician Wayne Mackay and I were given the tasks of performing a 
more detailed assessment and formulating a recovery plan.  From the fifth floor down (mostly 
administration and the teaching laboratories) damage was negligible; but it was significant 
and progressively worse on the three higher floors.  Books, computer monitors, pot plants and 
filing cabinets were strewn around offices.  Damage in the research labs was widespread but 
apparently superficial, principally involving broken glassware, toppled bench-top instruments 
and silicone-oil spills.  Chemical containment vessels and cabinets appeared to have stood up 
well, though some had migrated by as much few metres across laboratory floors.  From a 
cursory external inspection, there was no glaring evidence of damage to major instruments, 
although subsequent testing was to reveal significant and irreparable internal damage to a 
new mass spectrometer and lesser damage to several other instruments. 
The major part of the recovery process was implemented over the next four days as follows:  
Tuesday 7 September: Seven staff members (Wayne Mackay, Laurie Anderson, Alistair 
Duff, Matt Polson, Rob Stainthorpe, Nick Oliver and I), with skills in areas ranging from 
photography to hazard management, worked to identify, document and undertake first-order 
mitigation of hazards.  Our principal aim was to make the department safe for other workers 
to start their clean-up procedures.  Secondary aims were to generate records for insurance 
purposes (and posterity) and to establish priorities for action over the following days.  Most 
of the work involved photography, picking up equipment and containers, sweeping up broken 
glassware, and initial efforts at cleaning up oil and chemical spillages.  Freezers and 
refrigerators were sealed, to be dealt with by a more specialised group on the next day. 
Wednesday 8 September:  In the morning, appropriately skilled technical and academic 
staff made initial assessments of the condition of major equipment (X-ray diffractometer, 
NMR and mass spectrometers) prior to contacting manufacturers and service companies.  At 
the same time, a subgroup of the departmental Safety Committee collated and examined 
inventories of refrigerator, freezer and cold-room contents, to identify toxic or particularly 
reactive substances.  During the afternoon this latter group unsealed and inspected most of 
the refrigerators and freezers, leaving a couple of especially hazardous substance to be dealt 
with later when breathing apparatus were available.  In the event, those materials had been 
very securely protected and isolated, and presented no actual hazard.  
 
Thursday 9 September:  Academic and technical staff were invited in to tidy their offices 
and workshops, and to inspect their laboratories.  A small group of PC-trained research 
students assisted with the assessment and tidying of the department’s PC2 lab and technical 
staff started the testing and safety certification of electrical equipment.  General clean-up 
procedures continued and by the end of the day the laboratory floors were completely cleared 
of oil.   
 
Friday 13 September:  All staff and research students were permitted back into the 
department to proceed with cleaning up and damage amelioration, with the proviso that no 
research was to be undertaken until laboratories had been certified safe by the department’s 
safety officer, Professor Ian Shaw. 
 
By the end of that week, the department was well down the track to recovery.  With the 
assistance of Facilities Management personnel, most of the infrastructure had been restored.  
Fume hoods were still switched off awaiting confirmation that ducting was intact, and the 
restarting of major instruments was stalled while advice was sought from manufacturers and 
service companies.  We could have resumed undergraduate teaching in the following week, 
but other sections of the university (particularly the libraries) were taking longer to recover.  
With the added stress of the ongoing aftershocks, it was determined that undergraduates 
would not be permitted back on to campus till the following Wednesday, with teaching 
starting on 20 September.  
 
So what did we learn from this event?  
Firstly, due to numerous incremental earthquake mitigation modifications prior to the event, 
we were actually very well prepared.  Perspex guards mounted around chemical shelving and 
laboratory bench dividers were extremely effective at preventing chemical containers from 
spilling on to the floor or bench tops.  Storage-shelf lips of a little as 2-cm height seem to 
have entirely prevented equipment falls, whereas books and papers stored on office shelves 
with no lips were liberally scattered around offices.  Evidently, items on flat surfaces had 
mostly shuffled laterally during the shake rather than bouncing.  Substances in refrigerators 
and freezers had been well contained in plastic trays and sealed plastic containers proved to 
be particularly safe for holding hazardous materials 
A few things didn’t fare so well.  Chains used to fix light fittings to the ceiling and (in a 
couple of instances) gas cylinders to walls had been shaken off open-loop hooks.  Items left 
on un-lipped bench tops fell to the floor resulting in a lot of broken glassware.  The latter 
problem was exacerbated by the fairly extensive spillage of silicone oil (used as an inert 
heating-bath medium).  The mixed glass and oil was both the greatest hazard and the most 
difficult thing to clean up.   
Our response plan and actions went well, without resulting in any harm to personnel or 
additional damage to the building or its contents.  The photographs of the affected rooms 
prior to, and during, cleanup provided comprehensive records for insurance claims and also 
an opportunity for a post-clean-up departmental slide-show.  The stepped progression of 
activities meant that we could exercise control over access, particularly at the time when 
some potential hazards had not been specifically identified and aftershocks were at their most 
numerous.  Staff and students were generally very patient about being excluded in the early 
stages.  Perhaps the only real flaw in our arrangements was the difficulty of obtaining a list of 
contact phone numbers.  We had such a list on a university server, but infrastructural 
disruptions meant that we could not access that list for the first few of days after the quake, 
the period when we trying to check on people’s welfare as well as form task teams and gather 
information about stored materials. 
In light of our experience, what would be our recommendations to other similar departments?  
Here is a list of things that come to mind. 
 
1. For items (such as gas cylinders) secured by chains, closed-loop chain-hooks should 
be used with attachment by way karabiner-like shackles.  Open-loop hooks permit the 
risk that the chain will jump free during shaking. 
 
2. Guards (for example Perspex or wire) should be affixed to any shelves or sills where 
loose items (sample vials, chemical jars, desiccators etc.) are likely to be stored   This 
includes the tops of cabinets, refrigerators, ovens and any other places that are likely 
to provide tempting storage spots. 
 
3. Low lips should be considered for the edges of research-laboratory benches to limit 
the possibility of items rolling off the bench on to the floor.  Bench-top instruments 
(chromatographs, ovens, spectrometers etc.) should be fixed to the bench and stacks 
of such items should be strapped down. 
 
4. Spilt silicone oil is very problematic.  Where appropriate, alternatives to oil-bath 
heating should be used.  If oil-bath heaters are required, splash-proof baths should be 
employed (we need a design) and the oil should be returned to a sealed container 
when not in use.   
 
5. Items and substances stored in freezers, refrigerators and cold rooms should be 
contained in (preferably sealed) plastic boxes or trays.  Refrigerators and freezers 
should carry physical identification information that clearly specifies any hazardous 
substances they contain and the person who should be contacted in case of an adverse 
event. 
 
6. Wheeled storage cabinets had migrated by as much as a few metres.  We wonder 
whether such cabinets should be fitted with wheel locks.  However, it is possible the 
motion of the cabinet as a whole dampens the risk of items toppling within the 
cabinet.  This is a question that could do with investigation. 
 
7. Half-sized filing cabinets should not be stacked on top of each other.  Filing-cabinet 
drawers should be closed with the key in the locked position to prevent drawers from 
shaking open and overbalancing the cabinet. 
 
8. Several specified members of staff should carry a full list of contact phone numbers in 
a cell phone directory.  All staff in the department should know who carries those 
directories and how to contact them. 
 
9. The department should have a generic emergency response plan that can be readily 
adapted to any adverse event.  It should be known which teams of which people 
should be assigned to tackle each type of predictable task.   
 
10. In case of a power outage, an accessible list should be available as to which 
instruments should remain switched off or be urgently restarted when power is 
returned. 
 
Our department has weathered the earthquake very well due to a combination of good luck, 
good planning and dedicated effort.  We owe a great deal to university Emergency Response 
Team and Facilities Management Personnel.  The overall emergency preparedness of the 
university was tested to a degree far beyond anything else in its history and shown to be well 
up to scratch.  A strong cooperative relationship between the pan-campus controlling body 
and the departmental response teams greatly facilitated our efforts.  Information and 
assistance was provided promptly, as and when we needed it without unnecessary 
bureaucratic overheads.  At the departmental level we are indebted to the technical staff who 
implemented the invaluable pre-quake mitigation measures and carried the majority of the 
post-quake clean-up workload.  These people put aside their personal concerns and anxieties 
at a time when magnitude-5 aftershocks were still a regular occurrence.  
 
 
 
 
Wheeled storage cabinets in research laboratories had migrated by as much as several metres.  
All of the cabinets in this photo had originally been under fumehoods or benches 
 
 
Unsecured stacks of bench-top equipment are prone to toppling.   
 
 
Sub-optimal storage of silicone-oil baths (top) and desiccators on unguarded sills.  
Fortunately, these items had not fallen, but silicone oil had splashed down the wall on to the 
floor. 
 
 
A consequence of stacked filing cabinets.  Toppled cabinets would have presented a 
significant threat to personnel if offices had been occupied during the earthquake.  
 
 
Spilt silicone oil presented a major slip hazard and was very difficult to clean up. 
 
 
Superficial mess in an upper-floor office. 
